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R E S U LT S
Marilyn J. Darling, M.A., and Jillaine S. Smith, B.A., Signet Research & Consulting LLC
Key Points
· Despite a significant influx of charitable dollars 
over the last 10 to 20 years, solutions to complex 
social problems remain elusive, while philanthropy 
has been facing growing pressure to account for 
its tax-free dollars; to demonstrate, replicate, and 
scale success; and to be transparent about failed 
social investments.
· When foundations and their nonprofit partners 
ignore a failure and move on, whether it is to 
protect their own reputation or the reputations of 
valued partners or simply because of the pressure 
to keep going, it is too easy to toss out the baby 
with the bathwater – to toss aside a good idea 
and start over. This is a sign of failing to learn.
· Learning from failure requires the difficult task 
of changing deeply rooted habits of thinking, 
decision-making, and interacting. This is especially 
true in the social sector, where there are many 
competing and equally important priorities – from 
providing needed community services and build-
ing organizational capacity to achieving systemic 
change.
· What does it take to actually learn those lessons 
and improve future performance? Reflecting on 
failures and publishing “lessons learned” reports 
are good first steps, but do not guarantee that 
those lessons will translate into improved results. 
· In this article, the authors explore in detail what it 
looks like for a lesson to be truly learned, and offer 
concrete recommendations about steps to take to 
make sure that an important lesson, once identi-
fied, actually turns into a lesson learned.
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S E C T O R
Introduction
Despite a significant influx of charitable dollars 
over the last 10 to 20 years, solutions to complex 
social problems remain elusive (Anheier & Leat, 
2006; Damon & Verducci, 2006; Eisenberg, 2004). 
Philanthropy has been facing growing pressure to 
account for its tax-free dollars; to demonstrate, 
replicate and scale success; and to be transparent 
about failed social investments (Tierney, 2007). 
Learning from failures to improve future per-
formance has become a priority not only for the 
learning and evaluation community, but increas-
ingly for programs and executive teams as well.
“Failure” is a loaded term. Some foundations 
prefer to talk about “mistakes” or “disappoint-
ments” to make them safer to surface and discuss 
internally, and to protect their reputation and 
that of their nonprofit partners. Michael Schrage 
(2010) observed that “our failure to define failure 
can undermine our ability to learn from it.” It is 
far easier to learn from partial failures or “un-
derachievers” than from total disasters because 
the causes are easier to discover and learn from. 
For purposes of this article, we will use the word 
“failure” to mean instances when results fall short 
of expectations. A failure can be large and cata-
strophic, causing an unfortunate but inevitable 
end to a large investment. More often it is small 
and recoverable, especially when a foundation 
and its nonprofit partners are good at learning 
their lessons quickly and well – before small, 
recoverable failures turn into catastrophic ones. 
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It is the authors’ opinion that the process of learn-
ing from failure is not just the responsibility of 
philanthropy. Given the complexity of working 
with a network of partners to achieve an outcome, 
the lessons to be learned don’t fit neatly within 
organizational boundaries. The analysis and rec-
ommendations that follow can be viewed through 
the lens of an individual organization – either a 
grantmaker or a nonprofit, and used within those 
organizations. But they will be of most value if 
viewed through the lens of the larger social sector 
– the entire network of foundation and nonprofit 
partners that have committed to work together 
toward a shared outcome.
When foundations and their nonprofit partners 
ignore a failure and move on, whether to protect 
their own reputation or the reputations of valued 
partners or simply because of the pressure to keep 
going, it is too easy to toss out the baby with the 
bathwater – to toss aside a good idea and start 
over. This is a sign of failing to learn. And it is a 
waste of an investment. The ultimate result of 
going from solution to solution without gaining 
insight about what works when is that the same 
lessons get learned over and over again. (See Side-
bar 1: The True Cost of Failure.)
In their book, Money Well Spent, Paul Brest and 
Hal Harvey (2008) name acknowledging and 
learning from failure as one of the core tenets of 
strategic philanthropy. Grantmakers for Effec-
tive Organizations (GEO) convened a group of 
grantmakers to do peer learning around the topic, 
facilitated by one of the authors. Joel Fleishman 
devotes a whole chapter to failure in The Founda-
tion, observing that:
It’s understandable that foundations should prefer 
to trumpet their successes and ignore their failures. 
… Yet acknowledging, analyzing, and understand-
ing foundation failures could go a long way toward 
strengthening foundation practices, improving their 
success rates, and enabling the entire social sector 
to learn what didn’t work so that flawed approaches 
are not unwittingly repeated by others. Moreover, 
owning up to failures would be a sign of founda-
tion maturity and self-confidence, both of which are 
undermined by covering up failures. (2007)
Sidebar 1: The True Cost of Failure
In an era of high demand and stretched resources, examining the true 
cost – both direct and indirect – of not learning from failures becomes 
critical.
During our research into learning through grantmaking (Darling, 2010), 
we heard the following not uncommon failure story: A foundation relied 
heavily on a handful of intermediaries for an important and innovative 
community-change initiative. Several things went wrong, but perhaps 
the most critical was that the CEO of one of the intermediaries 
became ill and had to step down.
With no bench strength, the intermediary’s work stalled and tensions 
rose between it and the foundation’s other partners. After two years 
of disappointing results, the foundation pulled the plug on the entire 
initiative and shifted resources to “safer,” more traditional programs.
What was the direct cost of this failed initiative? At the very least, the 
communities served lost access to a service which, even though less 
than successful in the eyes of the grantmaker, provided public good 
to people who needed it. The foundation experienced an opportunity 
cost – money and staff resources that could have been devoted to an 
initiative that was producing greater impact.
Now consider potential indirect costs of this failed initiative: 
Without understanding the causes of the failure, other potential 
investors assume the innovative theory was flawed and withdraw 
support from an otherwise promising approach.
• By starting from scratch with another intermediary, the fou dation 
and its nonprofit partners forfeit the opportunity to grow a stronger 
partnership by actually learning from the failure. 
•	 The	reputations	of	other	grantees	are	damaged,	even	though	they	
performed well.
•	 The	foundation’s	reputation	is	damaged	as	community	stakeholders	
become distrustful of its – or even worse, any foundation’s – stated 
commitment to follow-through.
•	 Social-sector	culture	and	practices	shift	in	nonproductive	ways:	
The foundation’s board tightens up its oversight, becoming a 
micromanager of program decisions. Wanting to put the past behind 
them and move on, foundation and nonprofit staffs become less 
transparent and open about talking about emerging problems and 
disappointing results.
To be sure, not all of these costs are likely to materialize as the 
result of a single failed program. Fortunately, what foundations and 
nonprofits mostly experience are “less than optimal” outcomes, not 
abject failures. Unfortunately, too many organizations fail to grasp the 
partial success and therefore lose the opportunity to build upon it.
Now consider the potential positive impact had the foundation and 
its nonprofit partners learned how to learn from failures. If foundation 
staff had used lessons garnered from past programs to recognize the 
problem early, help the floundering intermediary pull through, and help 
repair strained relationships, the program might have been saved. The 
direct benefits might be that more members of the community would 
have received an innovative service from a collaboration of committed, 
aligned partners, and the foundation would have achieved at least a 
portion of the impact promised by the investment. But beyond that, 
the indirect benefits could include making future investments easier to 
leverage through innovative grants, stronger partnerships with more 
capable grantees, better decision-making, a board that understands 
the landscape and has confidence in the foundation staff to navigate 
it, and boatloads of goodwill in the community (Table 1).
In The Foundation, Fleishman (2007) cites as a counter-example the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s End of Life initiative, which was 
a completely “failed” initiative from the 1990s. As described in Isaacs 
and Colby (2009), the foundation learned from the experience and 
conceived a much more holistic strategy to replace it. Ultimately, Bill 
Moyers created a television documentary that led to a citizen-led 
network of end-of-life groups in 20 cities and recognition of the issue 
as a health care discipline.
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Easier said than done. Learning from failure re-
quires the difficult task of changing deeply rooted 
habits of thinking, decision-making, and ways of 
interacting (Grantmakers for Effective Organiza-
tions, 2007). This is especially true in the social 
sector, where there are many competing priorities 
(Unwin, 2005) and where engaging in learning 
activities might not be seen as mission-critical 
by overcommitted foundation and nonprofit staff 
members. Such staff face the conundrum of feel-
ing pressure to produce impact while not having 
time to hone their skills. James and Wooten assert 
in their research that an essential capacity for 
leading under pressure is the ability for an organi-
zation to learn (James & Wooten, 2009). 
What does it take to actually learn those lessons 
and improve future performance? Reflecting on 
failures and publishing “lessons learned” reports 
are good first steps, but alone do not guarantee 
that those lessons will translate into improved 
results. In this article, the authors explore in 
detail what it looks like for a lesson to be truly 
learned, and offer concrete recommendations 
about steps to take to make sure that an impor-
tant lesson, once identified, actually turns into a 
lesson learned.
Publishing Lessons Learned Reports 
About Failures
Historically, the social sector has proven itself to 
be weak at looking honestly at failure and learn-
ing from it. In Mistakes to Success, Bob Giloth 
of the Annie E. Casey Foundation and Colin 
Austin of the nonprofit MDC Inc., make the case 
that, while much can be learned from failures, 
the social sector must first break through “the 
propensity for ignoring and hiding, rather than 
disclosing and reflecting on, failed approaches” 
and reflect on them honestly (2010, p. 2). And 
once that barrier is breached, the sector’s skill at 
actually learning from those insights is in need of 
development. “The learning crisis we face in the 
nonprofit sector impedes our ability to be more 
effective in reaching better outcomes for families 
and communities” (Giloth & Austin, 2010, p. 2).
To begin to turn the tide, some foundations have 
taken the courageous step of publishing “lessons 
learned” reports about failed programs. Leaders 
in this effort include some of the largest grant-
making organizations, all of which have published 
“lessons learned” reports or articles about impor-
tant failures: 
•	 The Annie E. Casey Foundation was an early 
pioneer in sharing painful lessons. The Path of 
Most Resistance addressed the disappointing 
results of their New Futures initiative (Annie 
E. Casey Foundation, 1995). More recently, 
the foundation published “Philanthropy and 
Mistakes: An Untapped Resource,” in which it 
used the publication of three failures to make 
the case for examining failures as a means to 
improve results (Giloth & Gerwitz, 2009).
•	 In a 2003 reflection about the demise of 
SeaChange, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation 
admitted that the vision, intention, and convic-
tion behind its $735,000 underwriting was not 
matched with an equal measure of rigor, action, 
and evidence (W. K. Kellogg Foundation, 2003).
•	 The James Irvine Foundation reported on its 
attempts to correct its course and salvage a $60 
million investment in after-school programs 
gone wrong (Walker, 2007). 
•	 The Carnegie Corp. admitted that a $200 mil-
lion grant to Zimbabwe was “long on hope and 
short on strategy” (Carnegie, 2007). 
Potential costs of failure Benefits of learning to learn from failure
Direct Community: Lost access to services
Social sector: Opportunity cost
Community: Greater access to innovative services
Social sector: Demonstrated results
Indirect Damage to potential innovative solution
Loss of valued partners
Community distrust
Greater board oversight
Reduced staff risk-taking and disclosure
Better decision-making
Stronger partnerships with more capable grantees
Board confidence
Staff confidence and transparency
Community goodwill
TABLE 1  Potential Costs/Benefits Related to Failure and Learning To Learn From It
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•	 In his courageous and much-publicized admis-
sion, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation 
President Paul Brest bared the grantmaker’s 
inability to see much change from its 10-year, 
$20 million investment in improving the lives 
of residents (Brown & Feister, 2007).
•	 The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation dedi-
cated an entire issue of its To Improve Health 
and Healthcare series to its own lessons 
learned from “programs that did not work out 
as expected” (Isaacs & Colby, 2010, p. 5).
•	 Bill Gates has been remarkably candid in sever-
al interviews about his foundation’s frustration 
with missteps in its quest to eradicate polio and 
malaria through wide availability of vaccines 
(Guth, 2010).
Being deliberate about publishing “lessons 
learned” reports helps communicate a founda-
tion’s intention to be transparent and to not hold 
itself up as the infallible expert. It also serves as a 
potential source of wisdom to others in the sector. 
By publishing reports of failures and the insights 
they have gained, the hope is that other founda-
tions and nonprofits will not make the same mis-
takes and benefit from the insights shared about 
what caused those mistakes.
Why ‘Lessons Learned’ Aren’t
Unfortunately, merely publishing a “lessons 
learned” report – regardless of how thorough 
the analysis behind it – is no guarantee of future 
success. This unrealistic expectation risks un-
dermining the effort to build the learning habit. 
It is especially frustrating to people who worked 
hard on creating a “lessons learned” report about 
a painful failure to review a grant report a year 
or two later and feel a sense of déjà vu settle over 
the room as familiar failures from familiar causes 
present themselves.
Three factors contribute to the gap between a les-
son learned and improved results: 
1. In a complex environment, the first lesson is 
usually incomplete, so simply implementing it 
does not produce consistently better results. 
2. The causes of failure often involve dilem-
mas or systemic tensions that are not easily 
resolved by “do this” recommendations.
3. “Fixing” the identified causes of failure may 
cause even greater failures in the future.
The First Lesson Is Usually Incomplete
Even the deepest of retrospective analyses of a 
complex series of events is prone to a number of 
errors. The people most able to understand cau-
sality may not have participated in the analysis. 
A key piece of data or critical perspective may be 
missing. The analysis may not dig deep enough 
back into the chain of causes and, as a result, par-
ticipants may land on “fixing” something that was 
actually caused by a deeper and more pernicious 
dynamic. The resulting solutions may be incom-
plete or not translatable to a slightly different 
situation in the future (Darling, Parry, & Moore, 
2005). For example:
•	 The failure of a health clinic to provide needed 
services to homeless women might be caused 
by offices that are too well appointed for and 
Sidebar 2: Peeling the Onion
One “lessons learned” report from a foundation participant in a 
collaborative cited partnerships with the public sector as both valuable 
and challenging. Bureaucratic delays drained the budget and set 
back the schedule. The collaborative remained committed to its work 
with the public sector, but the collaborative’s director concluded that 
working with a public partner requires “flexibility.” 
For a “lessons learned” report to be useful, its authors have a 
responsibility to fully articulate their lessons. “Flexibility” is a concept 
that warrants a more careful definition. How will being flexible minimize 
the impact on the budget and schedule? If the staff keeps this 
question in mind, the resulting hypotheses may help them hone in and 
test (and retest) their best thinking. Peeling back the onion in this way 
will lead to better understanding of the sources and early indicators of 
delay, which may then lead to such solutions as:
• developing healthy relationships with key public partners so that 
potential delays can be discovered early and mitigated;
• ensuring a shared understanding of respective goals – sources of 
alignment as well as where goals diverge, and how to manage that;
• planning to deal with the likely transition of key individuals in the 
collaboration; and
• breaking through assumptions about what steps are essential and 
where efficiencies might be found.
Continuing to ask, “What will it take to do that?” helps a community 
to continue to flesh out its thinking until a more complete solution to a 
vexing challenge is unveiled.
Lessons (Not Yet) Learned
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intimidating to their intended clients. 
•	 An early-education program might succeed 
in providing new computers to an antiquated 
school infrastructure, but children cannot gain 
access because the school cannot afford the 
staff to help them. 
The process of truly learning a lesson is one of 
peeling the onion until a more complete under-
standing and set of solutions is developed. (See 
Sidebar 2: Peeling the Onion.)
Dilemmas and Systemic Tensions Are Not Easily 
Resolved
“Lessons learned” reports often reveal inher-
ent tensions that don’t lend themselves to facile 
solutions. The choice is often not between right 
and wrong, but between things that are right for 
different reasons. A common tension faced by 
programs that are aiming to scale a solution to a 
larger population is between instituting common 
metrics and respecting local variations. Com-
mon metrics make it easier for the funding entity 
to learn across geographies, but may ultimately 
increase the failure rate when local communi-
ties find their needs conflicting with the larger 
initiative. This tension is at the heart of a dialogue 
about the Promise Neighborhoods initiative 
hosted by the Bridgespan Group and published 
on its website. Commenters talk about the trade-
off between “political concerns” and “community-
driven planning”; between a “franchise model of 
the world” and “the importance of local differ-
ences and the opportunities to harness creativ-
ity, self-organizing, and relationship building” 
(Howard & Stone, 2009).
Solutions that succeed in the short term may fail 
in the long term. In “Leveraging Grantmaking: 
Understanding the Dynamics of Complex Social 
Systems,” David Peter Stroh observes that “good 
intentions are not sufficient to produce positive 
outcomes. … Nonobvious system dynamics often 
seduce us into doing what is expedient but ulti-
mately ineffective” (2009, p. 121).
For example, a “lessons learned” report cites the 
need to anticipate delays and cost overruns and 
proposes developing a budget with a cushion 
to absorb them. But that conflicts with limited 
resources and the pressure to be efficient. Because 
extra time and budget always get used up, rather 
than padding every project that might run over 
budget, such a scenario begs the more complex 
question: What will it take to be as efficient as 
possible, in the face of anticipated delays and cost 
overruns? 
‘Fixing’ Failures Is Not the Same as Learning 
From Them
A much too common approach to correcting 
failures is to build institutional solutions to prob-
lems.1 Generally, building institutional solutions 
to “lessons learned” is about creating safeguards 
to mitigate the mistakes people have made in 
the past (which assumes, by the way, that human 
error was the true cause of failure). Saying “let’s 
never do that again,” foundations are prone to cre-
ating large, process-heavy decision-making and 
annual planning processes. The resulting proce-
dures and checklists might reduce the opportuni-
ty to fail, but they also can reduce the opportunity 
to learn – both for foundations and their grant-
ees. They can reduce opportunities for grantees to 
innovate and to respond to external realities. And 
they take people away from their real work. These 
often labor-intensive planning and decision-
making processes become so burdensome that 
staff members have less time to attend to what 
1 We are referring here only to institutional solutions, not 
to making course corrections in the middle of a program or 
initiative, which we advocate.
Even the deepest of retrospective 
analyses of a complex series of events 
is prone to a number of errors. The 
process of truly learning a lesson is 
one of peeling the onion until a more 
complete understanding and set of 
solutions is developed.
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happens after a grant decision is made, which, 
we believe, ironically sets up a vicious cycle of 
failures that result in more institutionalization on 
the front end.2
2 This dynamic is an example of the “fixes that fail” arche-
Lessons (Not Yet) Learned
For these reasons, it is better to think of “les-
sons learned” as “lessons (not yet) learned.” In its 
report, Evaluation in Philanthropy: Perspectives 
type described in The Fifth Discipline (Senge, 2006).
What does it take to use ‘lessons learned’ to improve future performance?
Inputs
· Leadership 
understanding of 
and commitment 
to learning from 
failure; modeling 
and rewarding new 
behaviors
· Tools for 
articulating thinking 
(logic models, etc.)
· Time preserved for 
reflection, especially 
during planning
· Collaboration 
platforms and 
community 
learning across 
organizational 
boundaries
· Real-time 
evaluation tools and 
effective evaluation 
metrics
Activities 
Foundation and 
nonprofit partners:
· Identify high-priority 
challenges and 
commit to learning 
about them
· Learn to build 
alignment by 
articulating thinking 
(actions and 
expected results)
· Study situations 
and learn what 
works when
· Develop the tools 
and skills needed to 
correct course:
- Learn to recognize   
familiar patterns 
(early indicators) 
that indicate 
potential pitfalls or 
leverage points
· Work together to 
create a culture in 
which problems can 
be raised early and 
talked about openly
· Develop skill at 
reflecting on results 
and take time 
to draw on past 
lessons from similar 
programs and 
situations to inform 
planning
Outputs
Foundation and 
nonprofit partners:
· Are focused on 
learning about high-
priority challenges 
in order to improve 
performance
· Are aligned around 
shared goals and 
metrics
See different 
situations clearly: 
- Choose the right 
(and realistic) goals 
and implement 
plans for that 
situation
- Predict and plan to 
avoid or mitigate 
likely pitfalls
- Recognize leverage 
points where 
innovation can 
expand impact 
and have the 
confidence and 
authority to try new 
ideas
· Recognize positive 
or negative changes 
and can correct 
course quickly and 
effectively
· Track results, 
reflect on them, and 
adjust thinking and 
action
Outcome 
A network of 
partners working 
together consistently 
stays on course to 
achieve or exceed 
expected outcomes, 
even in challenging 
and unpredictable 
situations
Impact
Direct:
· Community access 
to promised services
· Demonstrated 
results
Indirect:
· Better decision-
making
· Stronger 
partnerships with 
more capable 
partners
· Board confidence
· Staff confidence 
and transparency
· Community 
goodwill
Two important notes:
1. This describes an ideal state. It would be impossible to consistently achieve this outcome 100 percent of the time, but it is not an 
all-or-nothing outcome. Incremental improvement produces incremental value.
2. Like all logic models, it attempts to describe a very complex set of relationships and is probably inherently incomplete. The authors’ 
aspiration is to engage readers in taking a fresh look and to encourage a dialogue about the question.
TABLE 2  A Logic Model for Lessons (Truly) Learned
Lessons (Not Yet) Learned
2011 Vol 3:1&2 103
From the Field, Grantmakers for Effective Organi-
zations (2009) described learning as “a continuous 
process, a culture, and a commitment to support 
the capacity of people to reflect on their work in 
ways that help them see the paths that can lead to 
ever-improving performance” (p. 5).
The ultimate goal of learning from experience, 
either from failure or success, is to improve the 
ability of an organization or a network to achieve 
or exceed expected outcomes – even in chal-
lenging and unpredictable situations (James & 
Wooten, 2010). To accomplish this, foundation 
and nonprofit partners need to: 
•	 build their ability to scan and understand a 
situation;
•	 construct sound, realistic goals and strategies 
and effective implementation plans that fit that 
situation; 
•	 predict challenges and have access to the right 
tool kit to address them; and 
•	 know when to adjust and know when to stop 
something that has no chance of succeeding. 
This is no small feat and is even more complex in 
the social sector, where impact is possible only 
through the coordinated actions of a number of 
independent (and often independent-minded) en-
tities. Table 2 proposes a logic model for “Lessons 
(Truly) Learned” that recognizes the complex 
environment in which foundations and nonprofit 
partners seek to create outcomes.
An example from Isaacs and Colby’s anthology 
beautifully illustrates the reality of learning in 
complex environments. Community Programs for 
Affordable Health Care was a 1980s program that 
started with “an idealistic, sunny notion … that 
community representatives holding very differ-
ent vested interests would voluntarily put aside 
their own needs and aspirations to find a solution 
to a problem for the greater good.” In hindsight, 
“probably the main lesson is that foundations 
entering the rough-and-tumble world of local 
politics should do so with their eyes wide open” 
(2010, p. 2).
This is a good insight. It doesn’t overly prescribe 
a solution, nor does it suggest that foundations 
can’t succeed. Instead, it suggests that the real les-
son is not yet learned. By recognizing that there 
are challenges to be anticipated and prepared 
for, a community of actors can stay attuned to 
changes in the situation and opportunities to try 
out new ideas. Together, they can ask, “What will 
it take to achieve our shared goal with community 
representatives who hold very different vested 
interests?” 
Using Lessons Learned to Improve Future 
Performance
Much attention has been paid by thoughtful 
practitioners to the inputs listed in Table 2 (Hub-
bard, 2005; York, 2005; Connolly & Lukas, 2002), 
but not enough, in the authors’ opinions, to the 
concrete activities and outputs that translate les-
sons into lessons learned. By not attending to the 
middle steps of this path to learning, organiza-
tions can fall into the trap of measuring their skill 
at learning based on the presence of these inputs. 
Is the presence of these leadership actions, evalu-
ation tools, collaboration platforms, etc., in fact 
resulting in foundation and nonprofit partners 
who can actually recognize pitfalls and leverage 
points and adjust? 
The essence of building islands of 
mastery is to identify a handful 
of common sources of failure – 
such as – unclear grantor-grantee 
expectations, executive transitions 
in intermediaries, truth-telling 
to funding sources and/or senior 
leaders , etc. – and then create an 
extended campaign to transform 
“lessons (not yet) learned” into 
dependable building blocks of the 
craft. 
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Therefore, while the inputs listed in Table 2 are 
important and valid contributions, we will focus 
our discussion on five important activities:
1. identifying high-priority challenges and com-
mitting to learning about them,
2. building alignment by articulating thinking 
(actions and expected results),
3. studying situations and learning what works 
when,
4. developing the tools and skills needed to cor-
rect course, and
5. developing skill at reflecting on results and 
using those insights to inform future plan-
ning.
Identify High-Priority Challenges and Commit to 
Learning About Them
Foundations and nonprofits often make the mis-
take of thinking that they need to harvest every 
possible lesson from a failed program and address 
everything at once. In complex work, there are 
simply too much data and too much to learn. As 
with success, it is important to focus strategy on 
a few essential elements in order to learn. Mary 
Williams of Lumina Foundation observes:
One of the challenges is that there’s too much to 
learn. If you try to learn everything, you’re going to 
drown. We want to learn from every grant, every 
program, every event. It’s too much. The biggest 
challenge is to figure out what the most strategic 
things to be learned are and letting go of the rest of it 
(Darling, 2010).
Honing in on a priority challenge helps founda-
tion and nonprofit partners learn the craft of 
learning by making visible progress in one area 
and then seeing how it may be applied to other 
challenges and opportunities. We refer to this as 
building “islands of mastery.” 
The essence of building islands of mastery is to 
identify a handful of common sources of failure – 
such as – unclear grantor-grantee expectations, 
executive transitions in intermediaries, truth-
telling to funding sources and/or senior leaders, 
etc. – and then create an extended campaign to 
transform “lessons (not yet) learned” into de-
pendable building blocks of the craft.
For example, the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foun-
dation recognized that the lack of organizational 
skills among its key grantees was the weak link 
in their collective effort to make progress toward 
their goals. By concentrating on strengthening 
the foundation’s skill at providing organizational 
development assistance to its grantees, the foun-
dation developed a level of mastery over a few 
years that allowed it to focus on the next hurdle, 
confident that it could get grantees up to a level 
of organizational skill that would make it possible 
for them to succeed (Darling, 2010).
Build Alignment by Articulating Thinking (Actions 
and Expected Results)
In its report, “Essentials of Foundation Strategy,” 
the Center for Effective Philanthropy (CEP) 
makes the case that “foundation leaders’ concep-
tions of strategy overvalue the presence of a stra-
tegic plan and undervalue the logical connections 
necessary to have a strategy” (Buteau, Buchanan, 
& Brock, 2009, p. 5). CEP argues that leaders who 
are strategic “continually test the logic underlying 
existing strategies for achieving their goals” (Bu-
teau et al., 2009, p 10). This insight is not only rel-
evant to strategic planning. In order to learn, it is 
essential to become good at articulating thinking, 
Before-Action Review (BAR) Questions
A
C
T
IO
N
After-Action Review (AAR) Questions
•	 What are our intended outcomes and 
measures?
•	 What challenges can we anticipate?
•	 What have we and others learned from 
similar situations?
•	 What will make us successful this time?
•	 What were our intended outcomes?
•	 What were our actual results?
•	 What caused our results?
•	 What did we learn? (How will we adjust our 
thinking and actions for next time?)
TABLE 3  Before- and After-Action Reviews Help Articulate Thinking and Structure Learning During Implementation
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especially when working across organizational 
boundaries, in order to build true alignment and 
to test and refine theory in practice. 
Logic models, theory of change and evaluation 
frameworks are powerful tools to surface think-
ing. But as one of the authors reported in a recent 
research report, if it becomes a “once-every-five-
years-whether-we-like-it-or-not process,” it can 
become overly burdensome. It risks becoming 
an artifact, not often or easily revised (Darling, 
2010).
Every decision and action is implicitly or explic-
itly a hypothesis: If we make (this) decision or 
take (this) action, then we expect (that) result. 
For example: If we ask women in the community 
to help design health clinics that will be com-
fortable, safe, and unintimidating, then we will 
increase clinic use by the population we aim to 
serve. 
The process of articulating thinking should not 
be the province of initiative planning only, but 
should also be used throughout implementation 
(Woodwell, 2005). When assumptions behind 
decisions and planned actions are made explicit, 
the community of partners can better test their 
thinking and even extend it in innovative ways. 
The second (“then”) half of the hypothesis also 
proposes, at least directionally, how to measure 
effectiveness (e.g., an increase in clinic use by the 
targeted population). (See Table 3, Before- and 
After-Action Reviews, for a tool that helps groups 
articulate their thinking during implementation.)
Study Situations and Learn What Works When
So many of the lessons reported in “lessons 
learned” reports are about the environmental fac-
tors that caused failure:
•	 different levels of resource availability, com-
munity engagement, local leadership, etc. in 
different regions;
•	 changing market forces that affect replication 
success over time and geography;
•	 the role of politics and special interests in pro-
gram outcomes;
•	 perceptions by Third World countries of solu-
tions proffered by Western foundations and 
nonprofits.
For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion convened a conference of grantees work-
ing with the foundation on polio vaccines. One 
insight from the conference, as reported in The 
New York Times, was that “poor countries lacking 
regulatory authorities and highly educated politi-
cal and scientific elites may be nervous about 
being misused by Western scientists and care-
ful about accepting new technologies” (McNeil, 
2010). The question this raises going forward: 
What will it take to raise the level of confidence 
among local political and community leaders in 
poor countries? 
Capacity	  
to	  achieve	  
outcomes	  
Situa1ons	  
commonly	  
faced	  
Shared	  	  	  goals	  
The	  tools	  and	  
prac1ces	  
available	  	  
Figure	  1:	  A	  formula	  for	  growing	  a	  network’s	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  outcomes	  
FIGURE 1   A Formula for Growing a Network’s Capacity to Achieve Outcomes
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Certainly some initiatives fail for reasons that 
the partners involved could neither predict nor 
control. But to write off a failure due to “variables 
outside of our control” potentially misses a pow-
erful lesson about predicting and managing the 
environment in which social change happens.
Bob Hughes, former chief learning officer for the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, highlights the 
need to go beyond assessing and learning about 
program work to assessing and learning about the 
environment in which that work is carried out:
Environmental assessment begins with the environ-
ment in which a foundation operates; it starts with 
the context from which the goals and strategies are 
developed and within which they are carried out. It 
is at heart an external orientation, looking outside 
the boundaries of a foundation and its programs. 
(Hughes, 2010, p. 6)
The authors propose that “lessons (truly) learned” 
require a combination of understanding the “tools 
of the trade” and how those tools work to achieve 
desired outcomes in a variety of situations (Hol-
land, 1995). This has important implications for 
scaling initiatives and replicating best practices. 
Situation must be a deliberate part of the learning 
formula. (See Figure 1.) For example, a founda-
tion that aims to improve economic conditions in 
rural communities plans a series of community 
meetings. The goal is to identify and enlist local 
partners to lead the effort in their communities. 
The foundation will succeed in measure based on 
how well it understands the politics, natural re-
sources, sources of economic stability and stress, 
and sense of cohesion in each of the communities 
they aim to support.
Develop the Tools and Skills Needed to Correct 
Course
Failures can be big and fatal – destroying pro-
grams, promising ideas, and critical relationships 
– or they can be small and recoverable. In their 
insightful article, “Failing to Learn and Learning 
to Fail (Intelligently),” Mark Cannon and Amy 
Edmonson (2006) make the case that:
An intelligent process of organizational learning 
from failure requires proactively identifying and 
learning from small failures. Small failures are often 
overlooked because at the time they occur they ap-
pear to be insignificant minor mistakes or isolated 
anomalies, and thus organizations fail to make timely 
use of these important learning opportunities. We 
find that when small failures are not widely identi-
fied, discussed, and analyzed, it is very difficult for 
larger failures to be prevented. 
The ability to recognize familiar patterns – early-
indicators – that might seem mundane but that 
indicate potential pitfalls or leverage points, is an 
essential part of learning to improve performance, 
as is working together to create a culture in which 
problems can be raised early and talked about 
openly.
The evaluation field has been experimenting with 
new data-collection methods that give founda-
tions and their partners feedback in faster cycles 
during the course of a grant program, rather 
than depending on very slow-cycle post-mortem 
evaluation reports. Michael Quinn Patton’s writ-
ings on utilization-focused evaluation have done 
much to lead the field in this direction by insisting 
that relevant evaluation data should be available 
in time to inform decisions, both for grantmakers 
and for grantees (2008).
Some foundations have shifted from periodic 
grantee check-ins at prescribed times to the 
creation of inflection points designed to fit in a 
meaningful way into the grantee’s actual work. 
These include just-in-time oral interviews or 
In the authors’ research on learning 
through grantmaking, we looked 
at the strength of the link among 
planning, action, data gathering, 
reflection, and back to planning. 
We consistently found that the link 
between reflection and planning was 
weak if not broken. 
Lessons (Not Yet) Learned
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snapshot surveys conducted at multiple points 
over a program by evaluators who work more 
closely with grantees to create data that will be of 
value to the grantees in their own learning as well 
as to the foundation.3  Before- and After-Action 
Reviews are simple tools that can help foundation 
staff and their partners to train their attention 
in order to reflect and adjust as they go (Table 
3). This set of tools can be designed to be very 
thorough and rigorous, or used very quickly and 
on the fly to remind partners about their thinking 
before they walk into an event and check results 
just as quickly afterward. This makes Before- and 
After-Action Reviews very practical tools for busy 
foundation and nonprofit staff members (Darling 
et al., 2005).
Develop Skill at Reflecting on Results and Use 
Those Insights to Inform Future Planning
For purposes of improving future results, reflec-
tion needs to:
1. produce the best quality of insight possible 
from the experience, 
2. help participants develop information that 
will enable them to predict and prepare for 
similar situations; and 
3. link consciously to current and future work 
3 American Evaluation Association, November 2009 na-
tional conference session, “Evaluation to Inform Learning 
and Adaptation in Grantmaking Initiatives.”
within organizations and across the network 
of committed partners.
In the authors’ research on learning through 
grantmaking, we looked at the strength of the link 
among planning, action, data gathering, reflec-
tion, and back to planning. We consistently found 
that the link between reflection and planning was 
weak if not broken (Darling, 2010). (See Figure 2.)
Foundation and nonprofit partners can strength-
en this link consciously by looking forward during 
reflection to identify the next opportunity to test 
out insights in action, and by building into the 
planning process a “look back” at lessons from 
experience.
The most useful lessons to take away from either 
a failed or successful initiative are the ability to 
make stronger decisions on the front end and 
predict pitfalls or potential leverage points during 
implementation in comparable situations. It is 
important, therefore, to resist the temptation to 
jump too quickly to talking about solutions. 
The focus in reflection should be first on using 
the experience to gain a better understanding of 
the situation, and second on what lessons to take 
away that would improve future decisions and 
predictions:
•	 How did decisions made and actions taken 
interact with that situation to affect the result?
Act 
Observe 
Reflect Adjust 
Plan 
Increasingly,	  the	  
social	  sector	  is	  
improving	  the	  use	  
of	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  to	  
gauge	  results	  
THE	  WEAK	  LINK	  
Insights	  gained	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  not	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  make	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way	  into	  future	  planning	  
Social	  sector	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  is	  well-­‐
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  in	  this	  
part	  of	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Figure	  2:	  The	  Weak	  Link	  in	  “Lessons	  Learned”	  
FIGURE 2   The Weak Link in "Lessons Learned"
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•	 If we could turn the clock back, what different 
decisions would we have made and why? 
•	 If we could turn the clock back, what early indi-
cators might have been visible and what would 
it have taken to actually see and use them to 
improve the outcome?
Conclusion
In the largest sense, foundations take the bold 
step of publishing “lessons learned” from failures 
because of their aspiration to raise the quality of 
thinking and practice across the whole social sec-
tor. We suggest that the insights thus shared be 
thought of as “lessons (not yet) learned.” To im-
prove the quality of learning and practice across 
the sector, we must go beyond avoiding past mis-
takes and replicating solutions to a deeper inquiry 
into what it will take to achieve the social change 
we seek, in the wide variety of complex situations 
we work in.
In Good to Great and the Social Sectors, Jim 
Collins advocates that leaders “determine your 
‘questions-to-statements’ ratio and try to double 
it. Ask more questions and make fewer state-
ments” (Collins, 2005).
We must improve our ability to ask the important 
questions and engage the whole community in 
exploring new ideas, testing them out, sharing 
their experiences with their peers, then formulat-
ing new hypotheses, over and over, until the most 
pernicious sources of failure are transformed into 
building blocks of the craft that can become a 
platform to solve other social problems.
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